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Abstract
Only by understanding the uniquely human ability to take a first- second- and
third-person perspective, can we begin to elucidate the neural processes
responsible for one’s inimitable conscious experience. The current study
examined differences in hemispheric laterality during a first-person perspective
(1PP) and third-person perspective (3PP) taking task, using Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). Subjects were asked to take either the 1PP or 3PP
in identifying the number of spheres in a virtual scene. During this task, single
pulse TMS was delivered to the motor cortex of both the left and right
hemispheres of 10 healthy volunteers. Measures of TMS-induced motor-evoked
potentials (MEP’s) of the contralateral abductor pollicus brevis (APB) were used
as an indicator of lateralized cortical activation. The data suggest that the right
hemisphere is an integral component for discriminating between 1PP and 3PP
and that the link between the primary- representational “self” (1PP) and the metarepresentational state of 3PP may lie within the LH.
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Introduction
The origin of consciousness has eluded philosophers, psychologists, and
neuroscientists, alike. In order to, fully, understand the origin of consciousness,
one must first deconstruct it into smaller, quantifiable constructs. Consciousness
has been defined as “states of sentience, or feeling, or awareness, which begin in
the morning when we wake from a dreamless sleep and continue throughout the
day until we fall into a coma or die or fall asleep again or otherwise become
unconscious” (Searle, 1997). Although true, this definition provides little help in
defining this cavernous term. Schiff and Plum (2000) state, “at its least, normal
human consciousness consists of a serially time-ordered, organized, restricted,
and reflexive awareness of self and the environment. Moreover, it is an
experience of graded complexity and quantity”. Eilan (1995) states,
“consciousness is a representation of a perception which is from an implicitly selfrelational point of view. This is one in which the self is not an object per se, but in
which the self enters perception in what is termed an “essentially perspectiva!”
point of view.” Taking aspects from each of these definitions, I would argue that
consciousness should not be considered a solitary state of being but rather a state
of fluid mental unification resulting from the additive and multiplicative byproduct of
heterogeneous neural activity; this unified state is one in which allows, at minimum,
a non-reflexive, anoetic1 state of perspectivity. It is “perspective” which defines
consciousness as a phenomena of inimitability. Only by understanding the neural

1Anoetic is a state of consciousness that is pure passive receptiveness without understanding or intellectual
organization of the materials presented (Miriam Webster Online, 2007).
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processes of perspective can we begin to elucidate the neural substrates of one’s
sui generis conscious experience.
At the most basic level, all mammals possess a first person-perspective
(1PP), also termed “central-representation” (Taylor, 2001), “primary representation”
(Vogeley, 2003) or an “essential perspectival” (Eilan, 1995). This is the
nonreflexive ability to simply know without explicit reflection or meta-representation
of any kind. The 1PP can be considered passive receptiveness; in taking the 1PP,
one would not think, “I am here”, but rather “here” (Eilan, 1995). The second
person-perspective (2PP) is commonly defined as the ability to monitor one’s own
mental state in a self-representational capacity, otherwise known as being selfaware (SA; Gallup, 1970). In doing so, one is able to attend to one’s own
cognitions in a proprietary, self-reflective manner. This perspective requires the
emergence of one’s objective self (i.e. self as an independent entity).
Differentiating between 1PP and 2PP is dependent upon the ability to actively
monitor or mentalize one’s thoughts in the past, present, and future (2PP) as
opposed to mere present awareness (1PP).
Self-awareness (2PP) is a fundamental component of a third personperspective (3PP), or “theory of mind” (ToM), in which one is able to make
inferences and attributions about various mental states of others (Premack &
Woodruf, 1978). Theory of mind and SA differ in that during ToM the cognitive
process is specifically directed outward onto a third party (3PP) as opposed to the
self (2PP). For purposes of clarity, the contrasts between 1PP, 2PP and 3PP can
be thought of as steps on a ladder: 1PP as awareness, 2PP as self-awareness,
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and 3PP as other-awareness (a.k.a. ToM). These terms will be used
synonymously throughout, although specific intent to use the term “perspective”
(i.e. 1PP, 2PP, 3PP) will be maintained in order to clearly distinguish between the
various representational states.
A substantial benefit exists in having more than one perspective and being
able to shift these perspectives. One’s self-concept (a byproduct of SA) “is a
mediating variable that facilitates the attainment of desired outcomes” (Byrne and
Ottawa, 2001). Perspective taking allows us to engage in cognitive self-monitoring
and mental time-travel (i.e. ‘cognitive goldilocks’, Keenan et. al., 2003). From an
evolutionary perspective, this ability has provided a significant survival advantage.
Self-reflection, planned behavior, intentionality, and internal motivation aid in the
attainment and securing of resources (Keenan 2003; Buss, 2003). The 2PP is not
only advantageous for self-analysis; its mediating role in taking the 3PP may be
even more valuable. As stated, self-awareness (2PP) is believed to be a
necessary and antecedent cognitive ability for the development of ToM (3PP). As
such, the benefit of 3PP mental modeling is also especially useful in terms of
survival advantage. The ability to sense the skills and threats posed by others
mediates self-action, thus circumventing danger (Buss, 2003; Keenan, 2004;
Taylor, 2001). Additionally, 3PP enables the intentional deception of others and
the ability to speculate deception used by others. In order to deceive, one must
first mentally infer the cognitions of another (the “deceptee”) so that intentional
falsification can be maximally applied. Not surprisingly, deception has been
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shown to serve an adaptive benefit during mate selection and attainment of
resources in both humans and primates (Buss, 2004; de Waal, 1998).
Evidence suggests that there is a theoretical and additive relationship
among these perspective-taking abilities. “The stepladder assumption”, as I call it,
assumes that each perspective, from the most basic (1PP) to the highest level
(3PP), are linearly dependent. Therefore, one cannot take a 3PP with out first
having a 2PP ability (Gallup, 1996; Keenan, 2004, Vogeley, 2003). In this way,
each perspective is acquired through the assumption of each preceding
perspective (i.e. you cannot climb to the third step without, first, walking up steps
one and two). Evidence in humans and the great apes reflect this supposition.
Infants, like all other animals, have a 1PP; “they form central (or primary)
representations of the present that are, more or less, accurate reflections of
perceived reality” (Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1991). Around two years of age, toddlers
begin to recognize themselves in mirrors. This ability requires the linking of such a
central representation to a mental representation of oneself (i.e. seeing me vs.
knowing me) and must first begin with “seeing me” (1PP; Asendorpf, Warkentin
and Baudonnier, 1996). The 2PP ability has been shown to develop in synchrony
with aspects of 3PP, such as empathic behavior to victims of distress and
synchronic imitation of peers, during play (Asendorpf et al., 1996). At this age, the
3PP, although not fully formed and prone to error, emerges synchronously with the
2PP. This is likely due to the fact that both cognitive states are based on
secondary representational abilities. Additional studies have found that a more
complex understanding of ToM develops by age 4 (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994) and

Corticospinal Excitability and Taking Perspectives

11

has shown to be correlated with deceptive ability (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989;
Ritblatt, 2000). A number of correlational studies have also demonstrated a link
among perspectives. Malcolm & Keenan, (2003) found that SA, as measured by
the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) and the Self Consciousness
Scale (SCS), was correlated with deception detection accuracy. Based upon such
evidence, first person-perspective (1PP), SA (2PP) and ToM (3PP) are
theoretically linked based upon inherent similarity of shared function and
application. It is likely, therefore, similar neural networks mediate such cognitive
processes.
The neural correlates of self-awareness (2PP) have been investigated using
a variety of populations and techniques. One of the most common techniques used
to study self-awareness (2PP) is the use of one’s self-face in recognition tasks.
Viewing of the self-face, and variations of such, has repeatedly activated regions
within the right hemisphere (RH). Using fMRI, Platek, Keenan, Gallup and
Mohamed (2003) found significant activation in the right superior, middle, and
inferior frontal gyri during self-face processing as compared to familiar face
processing. Working with split-brain patients, Roger Sperry (1979) discovered that
the right hemisphere, previously thought of as the minor hemisphere, is capable of
self-recognition and strong emotional responses to the self-face. More recently,
Keenan et al. (2004) found that a callosotomy patient was more likely to detect
himself in a morphed face of himself and a familiar face when it was presented to
the right hemisphere as compared to the left hemisphere. Using a similar facemorph paradigm, left hemisphere (LH) anesthetization (WADA test) was found to
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increase self-identification, whereas anesthetization of the right hemisphere
resulted in an increase of other-face recognition (Keenan, Nelson, O’Connor, &
Pascual-Leone, 2001). Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) cortical
activity was greater in the RH than the LH, during the presentation of masked self
faces (2PP) as compared to masked-other faces (3PP; Theoret, Kobayashi,
Merabet, Wagner, Tormos, and Pascual-Leone, 2004). Additionally, Preilowski et
al., (1977) found that one’s galvanic skin response (GSR) to the self-face was two
times as large as when seeing other-faces with the right hemisphere.
Furthermore, using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), Keenan, Nelson,
O’Connor, and Pascual-Leone (2001) found that during morphed self-face viewing,
the morphed pictures containing more self-elements result in greater right
hemisphere activation. Investigating passive and active self-face recognition using
Positron Emission Technology (PET) resulted in a number of activated areas in
both hemispheres. However, during passive viewing of the self-face, designed to
eliminate the effects of attentional states, activation of the right frontal cortex and
right supramarginal were observed (Sugiura.et al., 2000). Using Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) blood oxygen level dependant (BOLD)
activity during self-face viewing tasks has also supported the notion of a right
hemisphere preference (Platek, Keenan, Gallup, Mohamed, 2004). Additionally,
behavioral response tasks have identified a left hand advantage for self-face
processing (Keenan etal., 1999).
The study of self-awareness (2PP), however, has not been limited to the
face. Lou et al. (2004) found that self-referential judgments produced greater

Corticospinal Excitability and Taking Perspectives

13

activation in a medial network of prefrontal/parietal regions and the right inferior
lateral parietal cortex. Using TMS-induced motor evoked-potentials (MEPs) as a
reflection of lateralized cortical excitability, highly and poorly self-descriptive
adjectives were found to increased RH excitability as compared to the LH (MolnarSzakacs, Uddin, and lacoboni, 2005). Using the same task, Lou et al.
demonstrated a right prefrontal cortex (PFC) bias in task, such that transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) delivered to the right PFC disrupted first-order
judgments (Lou, Guise, Romanowski, Vogeley, Platek, & Keenan, 2005). In
another linguistic paradigm, Platek, Myers, Critton, and Gallup (2003) found that
subjects’ left hand response (RH initiated) to self-descriptive adjectives was
significantly faster than right hand response. However, those who scored high on
the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) evinced no lateralized
preference. An additional study showed that self-face processing in the RH was
impaired in individuals with shizotypal traits (Platek and Gallup, 2001) Not only do
these results support a RH dominance in self-related tasks, it corroborates self
processing deficits in those with Schizotypal traits.
Studying individuals in which “self systems are awry has provided some of
the most convincing evidence of a RH preference. Delusional Misidentification
Syndromes (DMS) such as Capgrass Syndrome and Fregoli Syndrome are
marked by the impaired ability to identify individuals (Feinberg & Keenan, 2005).
In Capgrass Syndrome a patient holds the delusional belief that “doubles” have
replaced a person or persons; in Fregoli Syndrome the patient believes that a
person who is familiar to the patient is impersonating a stranger (Capgrass &
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Reboul-Lauchaux, 1923; Courbon & Fail, 1927). The examination of focal lesions
in affected patients has implicated the RH (Feinberg and Keenan, 2005; Breen et.
al, 1999). A meta-analysis of 28 studies (N=1445) of DMS/R patients, Feinberg et
al. (2005) found that the greatest number of cases were associated with right
prefrontal lobe damage and every study evidenced a significant RH bias.
The right hemisphere activation shown in 2PP has also been demonstrated
in TOM tasks (3PP tasks). The Mind in the Eyes task is an effective paradigm used
to determine an individual’s ability to understand another’s mental state based on
the information conveyed by facial expressions (Simon Baron-Cohen, 1996).
During this task, individuals are shown the cropped eye-images of emotional facial
expressions. The subject is required to choose the adjective that best describes
what the person may be thinking or feeling. During this task, event-related
potentials (ERP) have shown activation of the inferior frontal and anterior temporal
regions of the right hemisphere (Sabbagh, Moulson, & Harkness, 2004).
Additionally, this task has shown effective categorization of high functioning autism
(HFA) and autism spectrum disorders (AS) between a group of healthy controls
(Simon Baron Cohen, 1996). Winner, Brownwell, Happé, Blum, & Pincus, (1998),
found that patients with post-stroke right hemisphere damage have some
impairment in attributing, and making judgments, based on belief states. These
patients were significantly impaired in their ability to distinguish a joke from a lie
and in their ability to infer second-order mental states, specifically pertaining to the
understanding of false beliefs and inference strategies used. Further, regional
cerebral blood flow measured during a PET scan of individuals tasked with
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interpreting the intentions of characters portrayed in a comic strip, was found to
further support a RH advantage (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 2000).
Self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment, guilt, and empathy are
theoretically linked to self-awareness (2PP) and ToM (3PP). Such emotions are
dependant upon the ability to be self-aware and are common emotions involved
during self-appraisal in relation to others. It has been shown that individuals who
have suffered damage to the right ventromedial cortex exhibited deficits in
empathy and general perspective taking. Additionally, right prefrontal damage has
been found to contribute to the lack of understanding during social faux pas tasks
(Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Aharon-Peretz, 2003). Autism, Asperger’s and
William’s Syndrome, though differing in specific diagnostic criteria, share a
common deficit in social cognitive processing in tasks involving 2PP and 3PP
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Ellis and Gunter (1999) found evidence to support that
right hemisphere dysfunction is, at least in some part, responsible for the social
deficiencies exhibited in these pervasive developmental disorders.
Although both 2PP and 3PP seem to be preferentially iateralized in the RH,
comparing perspectives “in-task” during functional imaging is necessary. Studies
using such contrasts have begun to elucidate the common and differential neural
correlates of these meta-representational states. In a recent fMRI study by Saxe
and Wexler (2005), participants were presented with a story about another person
that included: the character’s background, the character’s desires, and the
outcome of the story. Participants were then asked to choose how the character
might feel (positive or negative) about the outcome. Saxe and Wexler found that
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the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) was highly specific to the attribution of
mental states (i.e. The “how did they feel” question). In further support of a RTPJ
advantage, Decety et al., found that self-other representations are most likely
mediated by the TPJ and the prefrontal cortex, based on the review several
neuroimaging studies (Decety and Grezes, 2006; Decety and Sommerville, 2003).
Moreover, during self-imagined pain (2PP), greater activations were seen in the
anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) and the insula, whereas other-imagined pain
(3PP) specifically increased activity in the posterior cingulate, precuneus, and
RTPJ. However, Decety argues that the premotor cortex and the posterior parietal
cortex are activated during mental imagery of action and pain, in both others and
the self.
Using fMRI, Platek, Keenan, Gallup and Mohamed (2003) found that self
face processing (2PP) and mental state attribution (3PP) activated co-localized
regions in the medial and superior frontal gyri in the RH; however, ToM tasks
differentially activated regions in the left frontal gyrus. Additional imaging studies
have shown that medial prefrontal cortices MPFC are necessary for metacognitive
taks involving 2PP and 3PP (Vogeley et al., 2003; Schilbach, Wohlschlaeger,
Kraemer, Newen, Shah, et al., 2005). However, ventral regions of the MPFC were
associated with social interaction (3PP) while dorsal regions were associated with
self-reference (2PP; Schilbach et al., 2005). In further support of MPFC
recruitment, Oschner, Beer, Robertson, Cooper, Gabrieli, et al., (2005) found
similar MPFC activation during both direct and reflected self-knowledge. Arzy,
Thut, Mohr, Michel, and Blancke (2006) used evoked potential mapping to

Corticospinal Excitability and Taking Perspectives

17

examine contrasts between 2PP and 3PP. Subjects performed a task in which they
were asked to project themselves mentally to another body position in space
(3PP), and a task in which they imagined that a presented human figure was their
reflection in a mirror (2PP). They found that both the right tempo-parietal juncture
(TPJ) and left extra-striate body area (EBA) were activated during the tasks.
However, taking the 3PP resulted in additional activation within the right EBA.
Remarkably, in a previous study, Saxe et al. found that the right EBA responded
preferentially to the “allocentric” viewing of “others” body parts (3PP) as opposed to
an egocentric view (i.e. our own) (Saxe and Wexler, 2005).
Using fMRI to investigate the neural correlates of empathy and ToM, both
processes activated the MPFC and areas near the TPJ; however, additional areas
were recruited during the ToM tasks exclusively. These included: the right
orbitofrontal cortex, middle frontal gyrus, and right superior temporal gyrus (Vollm
et al., 2005). Vogeley et al. (2001,2004) found that ToM tasks and self-relevant
judgments elicited common areas in the superior parietal and premotor cortices. In
a follow up study, Lou, Guise, Romanowski, Vogeley, Platek, & Keenan (2005)
replicated Vogeley’s self-relevant judgment task, using Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation (TMS). By using TMS in a “virtual lesion” design, they were able to
temporarily disrupt cortical areas of the brain thought to be involved in self
reference. They found that TMS delivered to the right PFC disrupted first-order
judgments, lending further support to a RH bias. Mounting evidence supporting a
right hemisphere advantage for metacognitive (2PP and 3PP) processing suggests
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that the RH contribution to self-related cognition may be modality-independent
(Molnar-Szakacs, Uddin & lacoboni, 2005).
Although a large body of knowledge has examined the neural link between
2PP and 3PP, very little is known about the contrast between primaryrepresentation (1PP) and that of the meta-representational states of 2PP and 3PP.
It is unclear whether 1PP relies on similar or disparate cortical regions as those
involved during meta-representation (2PP and 3PP), and if 1PP is preferentially
lateralized in the RH. Examining 1PP in the research arena has been inherently
problematic. Isolating nonreflexive receptiveness in the human mind, without
introspection of any kind, has been methodologically challenging. One way in
which the 1PP has been successfully studied is through visio-spatial tasks which
require the “centering on one’s multimodal experiential space upon one’s own
body, thus operating in an egocentric reference frame” (Vogeley and Fink, 2003).
The egocentric reference-frame, as opposed to the allocentric2, refers to the frame
of reference in which object locations are represented by means of the individual’s
position in relation to the object (Vogeley, 2003). Vogeley et al. (2003) employed a
visio-spatial paradigm in which the individual was required to shift between one’s
own body axis perspective (1PP) and taking another’s vantage point as their own
(3PP), during the same task. Such perspective-contrasts in-task allows
researchers the ability to isolate individual contributions based on perspective
changes. Using fMRI, Vogeley et al. (2003) identified a common network of regions
within the occipital, parietal and prefrontal cortices during the task, for both
2 An allocentric reference frame, sometimes referred to as “exocentric”, refers to a framework that is
independent from the viewer’s (individual’s) position in relation to the object (Klattzky, 1998).
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perspectives. However, differential activity was seen in the superior parietal and
right premotor cortex during 3PP. Furthermore, 1PP recruited mesial prefrontal
cortex, posterior cingulate, and superior temporal cortex bilaterally. Using the
same visio-spatial paradigm, Lou, Guise, Romanowski, Vogeley, Platek and
Keenan (2004) found that TMS delivered to the right prefrontal cortex resulted in
delayed reaction times during the assumption of 1PP as compared to 3PP. These
results suggest a RH PFC advantage for 1PP tasks. However, additional studies
using perspective contrasts have implicated mesial cortical regions during the
assumption of 1PP ( Vogeley, May, Ritzl, Falkai, Zilles, Fink, 2003; 2004; David,
Newernick, Cohen, Newen, Lux, et al. (2006).
In addition to fMRI, PET, and ERP methodologies, Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation (TMS) has shown to be an effective tool in cognitive research. Using
TMS to investigate higher-order cognitive processes has provided researchers with
a noninvasive, delible, method to replicate the lesioned brain (Pascual Leone,
2002 Keenan, 2003). Single-pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) is a
functional imaging method used to briefly disrupt 1cubic centimeter of cortex for
1/1000 of a second (Pascuale-Leone, 2002). Stimulation is administered using a
magnetic coil held at the scalp. The magnetic field produced at stimulation site,
passes without obstruction through the skull and into the brain. By rapidly turning
the magnetic field on and off, a small amount of electricity is briefly generated in
the brain, thus causing cortical disruption in the stimulated area (Pascual-Leone,
1998). The advantage for using TMS in neuropsychological research is that it both
temporal and spatial resolution; the timing of neural processes can be mapped by
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stimulation of theoretically assumed cortical regions. Unlike fMRI and PET, TMS
data interpretation is not dependent on correlations between brain activity and
behavior, rather, evidence of direct causality. TMS data is interpreted by
contrapositive inference, specifically, the logic of Modus Tollens (i.e. if p then q; not
q; therefore not p; Thagard, 1996). For instance, if one believes that Brodmanns
243 (p) is responsible for music recognition (q), and the virtual ablation of
Brodmanns 24 (p) does not produce disruption of music recognition (g); it’s not
Brodmanns 24 (p). Furthermore, as in true lesion studies, TMS stimulation avoids
confounding factors such as non-localized “imprecise” lesions, lack of baseline
data and the development of neural compensatory mechanisms.
TMS may also be used in cognitive research to elicit a motor evokedpotential (MEP) which can then serve as an indicator of lateralized cortical
activation (Keenan, Nelson, O’Connor, and Pascual-Leone, 2001; Tormos, Canete,
Catala, & Pascual-Leone, 1997; Theoret, Kobayashi, Merabet, Wagner, Tormos,
and Pascual-Leone, 2004). Motor-cortex excitability is secondary to activations in
higher-order areas such as the prefrontal cortex; therefore, it is assumed that TMSinduced MEPs reflect general hemispheric activation through intrahemispheric
spread or through cortical-cortical and subcortical-cortical connections (PascualeLeone, 1999). The MEP produced by the smaller hand muscles (e.g. abductor
pollicus brevis) tends to yield the most consistent and robust MEPs, therefore is
commonly used (Pascual-Leone, 1999). The amplitude of the TMS-induced MEP is

3 Brodmann’s 24 is an associational cortical area in the anterior part of the cingulate gyrus; this area is a
cortical component of the limbic system that is involved in emotional processing, the control of facial
expressions and the affective dimensions of pain.
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thought to be positively correlated with the excitability of cortico-spinal pathways.
As such, a larger MEP amplitude would be indicative of greater excitability of the
primary motor cortex contralateral to the muscle in which it was recorded, thus
overall activity within the cerebral hemisphere (Pascuale-Leone, 1999).
Furthermore, by comparing H-reflex measurements to cortical stimulation, Tormos
et al. (1997) deduced that lateralized differences in MEP amplitude are, in fact, due
to cortical rather than spinal excitability. In addition, Munchau, Bloem, Irlbacher,
Trimble, and Rothwell, (2002) found that premotor cortex excitability can be
modulated by primary motor cortex stimulation, suggesting that changes in
excitability occur not only at the stimulation site but distant sites connected
synaptically. As such, TMS has been successfully used to investigate the laterality
of higher-order cognitive processes.
In order to further our understanding of the cortical mechanisms involved
during 1PP and 3PP, the current study sought to replicate Vogeley’s (2003) visiospatial paradigm using TMS-induced MEPs as a function of hemispheric laterality.
It was predicted that TMS administration to the right motor cortex would generate
larger MEPs during assumption of the avatar’s perspective (3PP). This prediction
is suggestive of the greater involvement of the right hemisphere during ToM. No
directional prediction was made for lateralized corticospinal excitability during the
assumption of the 1PP.
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Method
Participants
Fourteen adults were recruited via flyer and word of mouth from Montclair
State University and Seton Hall University. All participants were appropriately
screened using the TMS safety guidelines established by Wasserman et al. (1996,
1998). Screening sessions confirmed that all individuals were without psychiatric
or medical conditions excluding them from participation (see Appendix A). Of the
14 individuals screened, four were excluded from participation based on
contraindications of TMS use. According to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventoryrevised (Oldenfield, 1971 as adapted by Raczkowski, Kalat, & Nebes, 1974; see
Appendix B) eight right-handed and two left-handed individuals (4 men, 6 women;
mean age 22.1 years old; SD=2.84) participated in this study. Each subject
received $25 for participation in the study and were treated in accordance to the
standards and guidelines set forth by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of
Montclair State University. Written informed consent was obtained from each
participant.
Materials
A TMS-Magnastim 200 MonoPulse device with a 70mm figure-8 coil was
used to stimulate cortical areas of the brain. Stimuli were presented using
SuperLab (Cedrus Corporation, Version 2.01) on a Dell computer with 17” inch
CRT monitor. Motor Evoked Potentials (MEPs) were acquired using Biopac
MP150 amplifiers and accompanying acquisition software installed on a Dell
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computer. MEPs were recorded using three surface electrodes attached to areas
of the hand, using EC2 electrode paste and surgical tape.
TMS procedure
i. TMS preparation
For each subject, three surface electrodes were affixed to both hands, at the
abductor pollicus brevis (APB) and the belly-tendon montage, and a ground
electrode was placed on the back of the wrist. Subjects were fitted with earplugs
and a lycra swim cap and then seated in front a computer monitor. Participants
rested their head in a chinrest 33 inches away from the computer monitor so that
their midsaggital plane was horizontal to the presentation screen.
//. Determination of optimal site
The TMS coil was oriented tangential to the scalp with the coil pointing in an
antero-medial direction 45° from the midsaggital axis of the subjects’ head. The
coil was held over the area of the primary motor cortex responsible for eliciting
hand movements (see Figure 1). The optimal scalp placement for eliciting MEPs
of the APB was determined by moving the coil over the area of motor cortex until
the largest MEPs were elicited in the contralateral hand. The optima! coil location
was marked on the swim cap for each hemisphere.
Hi. Determination of motor threshold
Due to individual differences in corticoexcitability, a resting motor threshold
(rMT) was established (Wasserman, 1996; Pascual-Leone, 1994). The rMT was
determined by finding the lowest stimulus intensity capable to elicit a hand
response in five out often consecutive trials (Pascuale-Leone, 1994). The rMT
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was determined for each hemisphere and recorded by the experimenter. All
stimulation was administered at 100% rMT during the experiment.
Design and procedure
Subjects were presented with a virtual scene that included an avatar (a
virtual character) and a number of 1-3 red spheres surrounding the avatar’s head
(Vogeley et al. 2004; see Figure 2). The subjects were asked to respond verbally
to either “how many balls they see” (1PP) or “how many balls the avatar sees”
(3PP). Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was administered to
the motor cortex of either the left or right hemisphere 150 msec or 300 msec
following stimulus presentation. All stimulation was delivered at 100% MT. For
each hemisphere, 48 trials were presented for each condition (left hemisphere,
1PP; left hemisphere, 3PP; right hemisphere, 1PP; and right hemisphere 3PP). All
stimuli remained on the screen until a verbal response was made by the
participant. There was an inter-trial-interval (ITI) of 1500 msec between each trial
within condition. The left and right hemispheres were stimulated separately with
the order of stimulation and conditions counterbalanced across subjects. TMS
onset post-stimulus presentation (150ms vs. 300ms) was randomized for each
condition.
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Figure 1. Schematic of TMS coil placement over the motor cortex
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Results
Measures of TMS-induced MEPs of the APB were recorded. The
electromyography (EMG) signal was amplified at a gain of 1,000, filtered
(bandpass amplifier filter between 1 Hz - 500 Hz), and digitized using a sampling
rate of 500 samples/sec. All data were stored on a computer for off-line analysis.
MEP data were filtered off-line using a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) linear
bandpass filter (between 10-250 Hz). The remaining data were then rectified and
averaged within-subject by condition. Due to insufficient electrode impedance
and/or faulty acquisition, certain blocks of data were not included in the analysis
due to a preponderance of noise in the EMG signal. The threshold for data
rejection was defined as baseline amplitudes that exceeded 100pv. After data
rejection, group means were then computed.
For each condition, namely 1PP and 3PP, measures of TMS-induced
MEPs for grand-averaged data were analyzed in terms of peak amplitude, area
under the curve (AUC) and overall variability. First, a 2x2x2 (1PP/3PP; Left/Right
Hemisphere Stimulation; 150/300 msec TMS-Onset) repeated measures
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was calculated in order to compare peak
amplitude differences among all conditions. There was no 3-way interaction
(F(1,23) = .72, p=.40). However, a significant interaction between Hemisphere x
Perspective was found (F(1,23) = 6.55, p<.02). It was found that the right
hemisphere x self perspective differed significantly from all other conditions
(collapsed across 150 and 300 ms). The 1PP, during right hemisphere
stimulation, resulted in a significant decrease in peak amplitudes, as compared to
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all other conditions. Additionally, a significant main effect for Perspective was
found (F(1,23) = 5.57, p<.05), in that the 1PP yielded less robust peak
amplitudes as compared to the 3PP. This result is likely driven by the significant
interaction. There was no interaction between TMS Onset and Hemisphere or
TMS Onset and Perspective (p’s>.05). There were no other significant main
effects (p’s>.05).
A second repeated-measures ANOVA was calculated to examine AUC
differences. There was no significant 3-way interaction (F(1,23) = .02, p>.05).
However, a significant interaction between Hemisphere x Perspective was found
(F(1,23) = 11.63, p<.002). Similar to peak amplitude, it was found that the right
hemisphere x 1PP condition was significantly lower than all other conditions
(p’s<.01; collapsed across TMS Onset). Similar as well, there was a significant
main effect found for Perspective (p<.009), such that the average MEP AUC for
the 1PP was significantly less than 3PP AUC. However, there was an additional
main effect found for Hemisphere (p<.02) such that the right hemisphere average
AUC was smaller than the left hemisphere average AUC. There was no
interaction between TMS Onset and Hemisphere or TMS Onset and Perspective
(p’s>.05).
Again, a significant main effect was found for the self/other condition
F(1.23) = 8.029, p<.05, revealing a decrease in MEP area during the 1PP. An
main effect for hemisphere stimulated was also revealed F(1,23) = 6.66, p<.05.
Furthermore, a significant interaction between hemisphere and self/other
condition was found F(1,23) = 11.63, p<.05. The interaction between hemisphere
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stimulated and perspective taken, for both peak amplitude and AUC, indicates
decreased right hemisphere activation only during the self-perspective.
Lateralized differences in MEP variability may offer unique insight into the
consistent nature of the cortical response during differing perspectives. We
therefore examined differences in SD using ANOVAs. There was no significant
3-way interaction (F(1,23) = .004, p>05). There was no interaction between TMS
Onset and Hemisphere or TMS Onset and Perspective (p’s>.05); however, a
significant interaction between Hemisphere and Perspective was found (F(1,23)
= 8.86, p<.007). A post-hoc analysis revealed that the variability of the self-right
hemisphere condition was significantly smaller compared to all other conditions
(p’s<.05). Additionally, a significant main effect for Perspective was found
(F(1,23) = 11.66, p<.002), such that the self-condition was less variable than the
other-condition. Main effects for Hemisphere and TMS onset were not found (p’s
> .05).
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Figure 3. Peak amplitude measures of MEPs for the self (1PP) vs. other (3PP)
perspectives in the LH and RH.
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Figure 4. AUC measures of MEPs for self (1PP) vs. other (3PP) in the LH and
RH.
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Discussion
The current study sought to identify lateralized hemispheric differences in
cortical excitability during first- and third- person perspectives. These data
revealed significant differences within the right hemisphere for perspective
taking. Both peak amplitude and AUC differed significantly within the RH during
1PP as compared to all other conditions. No such differences were observed in
the LH. Specifically, reduced peak amplitude values and reduced area under the
curve was found during the 1PP in the RH. This finding suggests that 1PP
requires less activation in the right hemisphere. While it is not surprising to see a
general decrease in MEP measures from 3PP to 1PP, as a function of task
difficulty, the lateralized RH decrease is surprising. During the same task,
Vogeley et al. (2004) fMRI analysis revealed increased activations in mesial
cortical regions during assumption of 1PP as compared to 3PP. In another study
by Prencipe and Zelazo, (2005 ) the visual experience of emotional pictures from
the 1PP vs. the 3PP found that the assumption of the 1PP activated regions in
the cortical midline, the orbitomedial (OMPFC) and dorsomedial (DMPFC)
prefrontal cortex and the medial parietal cortex (MPC). In a study by David et al.
(2006) fMRI analyses revealed activity in medial prefrontal regions associated
with the 1PP whereas activity in temporal-occipital, premotor, and inferior frontal,
as well as posterior parietal regions were associated with representation of
others' perspectives (3PP). These findings provide evidence for distinct neural
substrates underlying representations of the 1PP within mesial cortical regions.
Given the support of cortical midline recruitment during 1PP, this would suggest
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that the current study should have seen similar activation within the left and right
hemispheres during the 1PP; however, a significant decrease was seen in the
RH. The RH reduction in potentials may be a result of paradigmatic limitations
(i.e., counting balls). However, this is unlikely, as a previous study using MEPs
(Tormos et al., 1997) found that there were no hemispheric differences in a pure
counting task. However, although Vogeley (2004) found differential activity within
mesial cortical regions during 1PP, a number of regions within both hemispheres
were active. Summation of voxels for common activations seen during both
perspectives (1PP and 3PP) within each hemisphere by significant voxel cluster
size indicate that the LH activated 1,976 voxels, among 7 LH areas of: the
precuneus, inferior occipital gyri, cerebellum, inferior pariatel lobule, superior
frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus, and superior frontal gyrus. The RH activated
8,377 voxels between the right medial occipital gyri and inferior frontal gyrus of
which a cluster of 8,103 was activated in the right medial occipital gyri.
Furthermore, summation of differential voxel activation by hemisphere by
significant voxel cluster size during 1PP found activations of: 1,177 voxels within
4 areas of the RH, 1,524 voxels within 4 areas of the LH, and 1,443 voxels
within cortical midline regions. These data suggest that more LH areas (as
identified by number of significant cluster size) were recruited during 1PP as
compared to the RH. The exact relationship among TMS-induced MEP
measures and cortical recruitment (voxel intensity vs. number of areas recruited)
needs to be investigated.
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An alternate way of interpreting MEP data is by the variability of response,
as opposed to AUC. This may provide unique evidence of hemispheric
differences. As such, the 1PP was significantly more consistent than any of the
other condition (LH-1 PP, LH-3PP, and RH- 3PP). This could suggest that the
RH easily assumes the 1PP role such that the minimal self (1 PP) is the default
state of the RH as opposed to the LH. If the RH is specialized for meta
representation, encompassing both 2PP and 3PP, the LH will require increased
activation to meet the task-specific demands. However, further investigation is
needed to support and clarify this relationship. Furthermore, the data revealed
that the RH response for 1PP and 3PP was significantly more consistent than the
LH responses. The consistency of cortical excitability may be a better indicator
of specialization. A number of studies involving EEG have relied, in part, on the
consistency of the data recorded. The application and refinement of such
analyses to the use of TMS may be beneficial.
These data also indicate that meta-representation results in significantly
increased corticospinal activity, as compared to 1PP. The RH exhibited
significantly greater activity during the 3PP as compared to the 1PP. This finding
is consistent with Vogeley et al. (2004) in which greater activation was seen in
the right hemisphere (right superior parietal regions) for the 3PP as compared to
the 1PP, during this task.
The questions remains: if meta-representational abilities of 2PP and 3PP
seem to be lateralized in the right hemisphere (based upon current literature),
why was there no significant difference in corticoexcitability between
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hemispheres during the 3PP condition? There are a few possible explanations.
First, although not significant, the right hemisphere did produce larger peak
amplitudes than the left hemisphere during 3PP. However, the AUC measures
were synonymous. This may suggest inherent differences in MEP latency and
length. As such, some studies indicate that the analysis of the post MEP silent
period4 (PMSP) may provide an alternate means of interpretation. However, this
was not possible with this data, because MEP recordings were not long enough
to capture the inhibitory response (typically 300 msec). Furthermore, there is
some evidence to suggest that the left motor cortex, in general, produces a
greater MEP response as a function of greater activation of the left motor cortex
in general (Pascuale-Leone, 1999). Interpretation of results can become difficult
under such circumstances. However, determination of both a LH and RH rMT for
stimulation intensity should circumvent this confound. Although a rMT was
determined for each hemisphere, a better determination of rMT may be possible.
Many participants may exhibit increased arousal and anxiety at the start of the
experiment due to nervousness, excitement, etc. This increased arousal could
subsequently effect rMT values. Future studies may want to include a period of
relaxation prior to rMT determination.
Again, analysis of Vogeley’s findings during fMRI suggest that lateralized
voxel intensity as measured by the summation of significant voxel clusters, found
active areas within the LH and RH during the assumption of 3PP. The largest

4 The PMSP is a measure of cortical inhibition that is a decrease in EMG activity following a MEP
(Pscaule-Leone, 1999).
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voxel cluster for differential activity during 3PP as opposed to 1PP was seen in
the precuneus (cluster size: 2,303, out of 3,614 significantly clustered voxels).
The large precuneus (bilateral structure) activation during the 3PP in this task
could have resulted in increased bilateral corticoexcitability. However, as stated,
the exact relationship among TMS-induced MEP measures and cortical
recruitment needs further study.
As stated, although a large body of literature has examined the neural
correlates of the meta-representational states of 2pp and 3PP, very little is known
about activations during the 1PP. Only a handful of studies have veritably
investigated the neural correlates of primary-representation. The lateralization of
1PP activity is difficult to place within the paucity of neuronal evidence. Further
investigations using converging neuroimaging methodologies and varied
experimental tasks are needed. However, given the nature of 1PP (self without
introspection) research remains methodologically challenging. “The development
of more sophisticated methodologies for investigating 1PP and of formalisms for
expressing them is the greatest challenge now facing a science of
consciousness. Only by developing such methodologies and formalisms will we
be able to collect and express first-person data in such a way that it is on a par
with third-person data, so that we can find truly systematic and detailed
connections between the two” (Northoff and Heinzel, 2005).
The current study suggests that the link between the primaryrepresentational “self (1PP) and the meta-representational state of 3PP may lie
within the LH as indicated by the similar LH excitability found. In addition, the RH
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may be an integral component for discriminating such processes. Further
research is needed to explore the LH link between these perspectives and the
discriminatory function of the RH during such tasks. The use of TMS and other,
more precise, neuroimaging methods as well as elegantly designed paradigms,
are needed in order to further our understanding of the neural networks involved
during such perspective states. In doing so, scientists will come closer to
understanding the neural basis of the origin of consciousness, enabling a better
understanding of the deficits associated with a lack of such abilities as well as the
neuroevolution of human cognitive function.
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Appendix A
TMS Exclusion Criteria
An answer of “yes” for any question from 1-10 would exclude participation. As indicated in item
#11, any medications taken which alter brain chemistry (legal and illegal) would exclude
participation (OTC analgesics excluded, i.e. aspirin, Tylenol, Advil, etc.).

1.

Do you have epilepsy or a history of seizures?

2.

Do you have a first-degree relative with epilepsy?

3.

Have you had a head trauma with loss of consciousness?

4.

Do you have a brain tumor?

5.

Do you have a cochlear implant?

6.

Do you have an implanted brain stimulator?

7.

Do you have pacemaker?

8.

Do you have a medication pump?

9.

Are you or could you be pregnant?

10.

Are you breast feeding?

11.

Do you take any medications?
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Appendix B
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory - revised
(Raczkowski, Kalat, & Nebes, 1974 as revised from Oldenfield, 1971)

Now I need to ask you a few questions about which hand you use to do certain
tasks. You can respond with right, left, or both. If you have no experience with a
given task, indicate no preference. Assuming that both hands are empty before
attempting each task, with which hand do you:

1.

draw

L

R

B

N

2.

write

L

R

B

N

3.

remove the top card of a deck

L

R

B

N

4.

use a bottle opener

L

R

B

N

5.

throw a baseball to hit a target

L

R

B

N

6.

use a hammer

L

R

B

N

7.

use a toothbrush

L

R

B

N

8.

use a screwdriver

L

R

B

N

9.

use an eraser on paper

L

R

B

N

10.

use a tennis racket

L

R

B

N

11.

use scissors

L

R

B

N

12.

strike a match

L

R

B

N

13.

stir a liquid

L

R

B

N

14.

eat with a fork or spoon

L

R

B

N

15.

which shoulder do you rest a bat before

L

R

B

N

swinging?
16.

with which foot do you kick a ball

L

R

B

N

17.

with which foot do you put a shoe on first

L

R

B

N

N um ber o f left hand responses m ust be less than 6 to be considered right-handed.

